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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Was the jury's verdict of no cause of action
so against the substantial weight of evidence that such verdict
should not stand?
Standard of Review;
competent

evidence

upon

"If there is any

which

a

jury

acting

substantial
fairly

reasonably could make the findings it should stand.

and

But if the

findings is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the court
that

no

jury

acting

fairly

and

reasonably

could

make

the

findings, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial
evidence."

Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138

(Utah 1982) (citing Sevbold v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 239
P.2d 174 (Utah 1951)).
Issue 2:

Did the district court err in denying the

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of all previous
injuries suffered by Plaintiff unless such injuries related
directly to the injury or disability which was at issue in this
case?
Standard of Review:

"In reviewing a trial court's

ruling on admissibility of evidence under Rule 403, [the Supreme
1

Court] will not overturn the court's determination unless it was
an 'abuse of discretion.'"

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239

(Utah 1992) . Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews "the trial
court's 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by
deciding whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision
that

x

the

unfairly

prejudicial

potential

of

the

evidence

outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond
the limits of reasonability."
P.2d 774, 781-82

Id. (citing State v. Ramirez, 817

(Utah 1991).

" [L]ike any other evidentiary

ruling, an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence based
on Rule 4 03 cannot result in reversible error unless the error
is harmful. Id. (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989) .
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

Determinative Law:
a.

Constitutional

Provisions:

There

are

no

constitutional provisions upon which the Appellant relies.
b.

Statutes: There are no determinative statutes upon

which the Appellant relies.
c.

Case Law:

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from an Amended Judgment entered on April
28,

1995, wherein the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint

after the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action against
the Plaintiff.
B.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition

On April 21, 1992, Plaintiff, Louis Ortiz, filed a personal
injury complaint

against Geneva Rock

Products

sustained in an incident on June 4, 1991.

for

injuries

(R. 1-4).

Prior to

trial, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to restrict, inter
alia, Defendant's introduction of any evidence relating to prior
injuries suffered by Plaintiff which were not directly related
to the injuries and/or disabilities complained of in the instant
case.

(R. 65). That motion was denied.

(R.

).

A jury trial was conducted from September 21-23, 1995, in
the case at bar. At the conclusion of the case, Plaintiff moved
for a directed verdict on the issue of liability.

(R. 667) .

The trial

The

court denied

that motion.

(R. 668) .

jury

returned a special verdict, finding no negligence on the part of
the Defendant.

(R. 213-15).

Plaintiff made a Motion for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative,
Motion for New Trial.

(R. 279-286).
3

The trial court denied

that motion.

(R. 2 92-94).

An Amended Judgment

dismissing

Plaintiff's complaint was entered by the District Court on April
28, 1995.

(R. 310-12).

May 4, 1994.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on

(R. 341-42).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 4, 1991, Plaintiff, Louis Ortiz, worked as an
employee of Lowell Construction Company pouring and forming
concrete for sidewalks.

(R. 378-79) . While pouring cement that

morning, the chute on the cement truck "froze up" and therefore
could not be moved from side to side or around objects.
383) .

(R.

The "lead man" on the project, Gary Cisneros, notified

the driver of the truck that the chute needed to be fixed
immediately or another truck was required.

(R. 3 84).

Upon moving the truck to the next location, the driver and
a mechanic commenced working on the chute controls, attempting
to fix or unstick the controls.

The driver was in the cab of

the truck and the mechanic was leaning in the driver's side
window.

(R. 386) . During this time, the Plaintiff stood in the

work area, which is a reasonable and appropriate location for a
cement worker to stand while waiting for a pour.
412, 417) .

(R. 385, 398,

Without any warning from the truck driver or the

mechanic (R. 389, 401, 653), the chute suddenly swung around and
hit the Plaintiff across the back, knocking him over the forms.
4

The force of the blow lifted Ortiz off his feet, and catapulted
him approximately ten (10) feet onto a nearby lawn.

(R. 387-

88) .
It is not common practice to work on the controls of the
cement truck wile the truck is "fully chuted."

Instead, it is

generally accepted that the chute should be "broken down" prior
to attempting repairs on the controls, or the truck should be
removed from the site.

(R. 389-90, 415, 417, 659).

Further,

the cement truck driver is responsible for the location of the
chute and it is his responsibility to keep the chute out of the
workers' area.

(R. 399, 417, 656-57).

Here, the mechanic and the driver were looking inside the
cab of the truck and neither they, nor anyone associated with
them, were watching the chute while they experimented with the
controls.

(R. 390, 391, 659). The mechanic had no experience

in driving a cement truck or finishing cement (R. 656); and he
did not view the situation previously described as "dangerous"
and therefore did not attempt to warn the Plaintiff to move from
the area.

(R. 653).

Finally, the mechanic acknowledged that

the driver of the truck bore the ultimate responsibility for
controlling the cement chute (R. 656-57), and that the chute
could have been "broken down" or taken apart before he and the
driver began blindly manipulating the controls.

5

(R. 659).

As

a result

of

the

foregoing,

the

Plaintiff

suffered

extensive injuries to his spine which resulted in long term
disability (R. 490, 495-96) as well as extreme and ongoing pain.
(R. 4 93) .

Consequently, the Plaintiff has been unable to work

in the construction field since June 4, 1991.1

(R. 554-55).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue 1.

The jury disregarded the overwhelming and

uncontroverted evidence that the Defendant was negligent in:
(1) attempting

to

repair

the

cement

truck

chute

in

close

proximity to the Defendant and other employees; and (2) failing
to warn those employees within the purview of the chute of the
dangerous condition that existed; and that as a direct and
proximate

result

of

such

negligence,

Plaintiff

suffered

permanent and irreparable injuries.
Issue 2.

Any evidence regarding Plaintiff's prior

accidents/injuries that are not somehow related to the injuries
sustained in the instant case should have been excluded pursuant
to Rule

402

and

Rule

403

of

the Utah

Rules

of Evidence.

Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in denying
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine.

The Plaintiff testified that the construction field is
all that he knew. (R. 555).
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY DISREGARDED THE ONLY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE AS TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE,
CONSEQUENTLY, THE VERDICT CANNOT STAND.
It is well settled that:
Determination of facts is left exclusively to the jury
. . . [and] [t]he only limitation thereon is that if
findings [or verdict] are made which are not supported
by any substantial evidence, or the evidence is so
clear that all reasonable minds would find one way, so
that a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted
from passion or prejudice, or misconception of the law
or the evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof,
the court will exercise its inherent supervisory
powers to administer justice, and will set the verdict
aside.
Lemmon v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 341 P.2d
215, 220-21

(Utah 1959); accord Rees v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Utah 1991); Batty v. Mitchell,
575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc.,
787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990).
In

the

instant

uncontroverted

case,

evidence

was

the
that

overwhelming
the

and

Defendant

virtually
and/or

its

employees or agents were negligent as alleged by the Plaintiff
in his complaint.
adduced

at

trial

Specifically, the only competent evidence
is that Defendant's

employees

negligently

attempted to repair a cement truck chute in close proximity to
the Plaintiff and other employees and that in the process of
7

doing so negligently allowed the chute to swing and strike the
Plaintiff without any warning whatsoever.
demonstrate

the prodigious

evidence

In an effort to

that was

introduced

at

trial, the Plaintiff will marshall all the evidence that goes to
the specific issue of negligence.
First,

Gary

Cisneros,

the

lead

man

on

the

project,

testified as follows:
Q.
finished
have any
you were

[By Plaintiff's counsel].
And when you
pouring -- excuse me -- strike that. Did you
difficulties with the chute at that time when
pouring down the street?

A.
[Cisneros} Yeah, we had just started pouring
and the chute froze up so we couldn't move it from
side to side or around objects. This particular area
where we were working down the street has more trees
and there was more vehicles that were in the way and
that is why I notified the driver that we needed to
either get another truck there or get the chute fixed
cause we can't, you know, move it by hand.

Q. Now would you describe for the jury at the
time the chute struck Mr. Ortiz, where were you?
A. I was approximately where the X is, sitting on
the grass.

Q.

Where was Mr. Ortiz?

A. Mr. Ortiz was in the pour area. He was like
racking mud for us and you get a lot of concrete on
your boots and stuff and a lot of people in the
neighborhood frown when you are standing on their lawn
with concrete on your shoes and it will kill their
lawns with the lime and what not in it you know. He
8

was in his work area in between two points, which is
very close to where this is. . . .
Q. Now at the time just prior to the time that
the chute hit Mr. Ortiz, did you know where the driver
and the mechanic were?
A.

Yeah I do.

Q.

Where were they?

A. The driver was in the cab, which is in the
center of the truck, and the mechanic was in his,
which would be his driver's side window, and they were
playing with the controls or trying to fix the
controls, get them unlocked.
Q. Would you describe what happened when this
chute began to move or just prior to its moving.
Would you describe to the jury what you remember about
this incident?
A. I remember the mechanic and the driver messing
with the controls inside and it did not move any or
nothing. And then I looked up cause I seen the chute
coming across, and what I seen -- I think I was
talking to Mr. Ortiz at the time and I seen the chute
coming behind him. And it just swung free. It swung
free and hit him, knocked him over the forms and then
the mechanic and the driver were concerned if he was
all right, saying that they didn't think the chute
would swing that far.

Q. Did you hear the driver or the mechanic tell
you or Mr. Ortiz to move out of this area?
A.

No, I did not.

Q. What in your judgment should have been done to
avoid this problem with the chute?
A. Well, if it was me personally, I would have
broke the chute down knowing that you were going to
work on it cause I know it is not a common practice to
9

be fully chuted and working on your truck. It should
have been broke down to the end chute, which could
only swing in front of the truck and not even barely
clear the bumpers.
Q.
that?

Now you say that is common practice.

Why is

A. You don't want to be fully extended in the
instance of hitting things. I mean, even like in an
instance like that, if it went the other way it would
have swung out into traffic or, you know, it is just
a big hazard. You can hit cars. You need to break
them down if you are going to work on them.
Q.

In this case that was not done?

A.

No, it wasn't.

Q. Both individuals were in the truck. Were they
looking outside the vehicle at all?
A. No, they were both looking inside of the
vehicle which is probably another thing I would have
done is got one of them out of there instead of having
four people dealing with something, four hands dealing
with something, there would only be two.

Q. Did
you
individuals?

hear

any

warning

A.

No, I hadn't.

Q.

About the chute breaking loose?

A.

No.

from

those

(R. 383-392).
Q. [By Defense counsel]. Did Mr. Ortiz need to
be standing where he was because concrete was being
poured?
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A. [By Mr. Cisneros] . No, he didn't. He was
just standing in the sidewalk where we were getting
ready to pour, like I had mentioned previously. . . .
He was in his work area and that is where he needed to
be.
Q. So let me understand this.
You say it is
whose responsibility to the end of the chute?
A.

It would be the driver's.

Q. And is it your responsibility to stay out of
the way of the chute as a worker?
A. Not as much as it is the driver's responsibility to watch for workers.

Q. When a truck is broken though, don't you think
you ought to take a little more caution for yourself?
The truck is broken and you are trying to get it to
swing one way or the other. Isn't that outside the
normal circumstance you had of foresight?
A. No, because I have dealt with a lot of broken
trucks before and some of the drivers break their
chutes down if it is the chute that is broke. Or our
biggest instance is with Geneva. We get rid of the
truck and get another one there.
Q. And if he doesn't break his chute down, do you
move out of the way?
A.

Generally not.

(R. 394-402).
Further, George Padgen, a former employer of the Plaintiff
as well as a superintendent of concrete for twenty-three years,
testified:
Q. [Plaintiff's counsel]. Assume, if you will,
that that is the pour area where this vehicle is going
11

to be pouring next. Would you do that? And assume
further that the vehicle itself and the employees, the
driver and the employees were having trouble, a
problem with this chute in moving it back and forth,
assume that they were having some difficulty with that
chute. And assume further that a mechanic was called
from Geneva Rock and he was going to work with or try
to repair this chute so that it could be moved to
continue the pour.
Do you have an opinion, Mr.
Padjen, as to whether or not it would be unreasonable
for an individual to be standing in the pour area at
the time they are working on part of the vehicle
chute?

A. I see nothing wrong with anybody standing
there unless the driver or the mechanic was to say,
"Get out of the way." But on one of my particular
jobs and that was my truck, I wouldn't wait for them
to bring a mechanic out. I would have shipped the
truck off and told them to bring me another one, and
when they got this fixed to bring it back, but I won't
even allow it to be there.
411-12)
Q. [By Defense counsel] .
In this case [the
truck] wasn't removed and Mr. Ortiz chose to stand in
an area where the chute could hit him while they are
trying to repair it. You don't see a problem with
that?
A. Not if he wasn't warned. You never know on
one of these trucks.
I have had a lot of chute
problems over the years.
I have seen chutes run
through forms. I have seen them hit people. Up until
15 years ago, we used to run our own chutes. Now the
driver runs them. We used to run our own chute. The
driver is the one that returns the chute now, so you
are at his mercy as far as him running the chute when
you are pouring.
417) .

12

Finally, the Defendant testified as follows:
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel].
There are some
marks on that exhibit, but would you briefly in your
own words tell the jury what happened just prior to
that chute striking you in the back. Tell the jury
where you had been and what happened?

A. [By Plaintiff]. Well, I had -- the mechanic
had come on the job and they said they were going to
fix the chute. I just walked in my work area. That
is where I worked. That is where I raked, that is of
my work area and I was just sitting on the shovel, had
my back to the truck and after that I don't know where
the mechanic was. I don't know where the driver was.
All I know is the chute hit me, and I flew over the
forms. I did fly over. I don't know how high off the
ground I went. I ended up landing right there.

Q.
What did the driver, mechanic, you don't
recall any conversation from them?
A. The only thing I recall was after the chute
had hit me, I don't know which one it was, had ran up
to me and asked if I was all right. They said they
had pulled a pin, from somewhere on the chute they had
pulled a pin and the chute started swinging and they
thought it was going to stop and it did not stop and
that is when it hit me, I guess.
Q. Did you hear anybody attempt to warn you of
the movement of the chute?
A.

No, I did not.

Q. When you moved into the location in the
sidewalk area where you have got "me" designated, next
to that M X' on Exhibit P-2, did the mechanic tell you
not to stay in that area?
A.

No.
13

Q.
area?

Did the driver tell you not to stay in that

A.

No.

Q.

Did they tell you what they were going to do?

A. Yes, I knew they were going to work on the
chute, yes.
Q. Did they tell you specifically what they were
going to do?
A. They didn't tell me what they were going to do
to fix the chute. They just mentioned they were going
to work on the chute, yes, that is all.
Q. You ever have an occasion when Geneva Rock has
taken a truck off of the location for repair under
these same circumstances?
A. I don't know if it was for repairing the chute
but they have.
In my previous experience they had
backed up away from where everybody was working and
worked on the truck, yes.
Q. What facts, if any, did you have at that time
which would make you concerned about the chute at all?
A. I had no idea it was going to swing. I was
just in my work area.
I had no idea.
I know it
swings back and forth, yes, I am not stupid of that,
but I had no idea it was going to swing at that time,
you know, freely like it did.
534- 541) .
The foregoing testimony along with corroborative evidence
the only competent testimony that went solely to the issue

14

of Defendant's negligence.2

In fact, each of the witnesses

consistently testified that the employee's actions in attempting
to repair the broken chute in the work area was not within
accepted or industry standards and that the more appropriate
remedial measures would have been to break the chute down or
remove the truck from the work area during the repair. Further,
not only did the fact witnesses testify that it was wholly
acceptable for the Plaintiff to remain in the work area while
the truck was undergoing repair, but that it would have been
incumbent

on

the

driver

of

the

truck

or

the

mechanic

to

safeguard against any accidents involving the cement truck and
workers.

Finally, the witnesses, including those associated

with the defense, consistently testified that neither the driver

The only scintilla of evidence introduced by the defense
was the testimony of Stephen Barnes, the mechanic, who
was called in to repair the broken chute.
The only
relevant testimony on the issue of negligence is that:
(1) he did not see a crew in the work area (R. 646); and
(2) he did not believe that he had any duty to check to
see if any workers were in the area. (R. 653).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the mechanic acknowledged
that it would have been wiser had the sections been
broken down (R. 659) and that no warnings were ever
provided to the Plaintiff by him or the driver.
15

nor the mechanic ever warned the Plaintiff that a pin had been
pulled and the chute was swinging.3
Inasmuch as the testimony and evidence in this case was
uniform and uncontradicted as to Defendant's negligence, the
verdict in the instant case was certainly reached as a result of
a

misconception

of

disregard thereof.
verdict

and

enter

the

factual

evidence

or

an

arbitrary

Accordingly, this court should vacate such
one

consistent

with

the

uncontroverted

evidence at trial.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
OF OTHER INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF
IN UNRELATED INCIDENTS WHICH WERE NOT SOMEHOW
RELATED TO THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF
IN THE CASE AT BAR.
In

his

Motion

in

Limine,

Plaintiff

argued

that

the

foregoing evidence should be excluded under Rule 4 02 and Rule
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(R. 665-670) .

The court

denied that motion.
Rule 4 02 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States of the Constitution of the state of Utah,
In fact, the mechanic testified that he watched the chute
swing and hit the Plaintiff without ever providing any
form of warning.
16

statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Utah R. Evid. 4 02 (emphasis added).
Further, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.
In the instant case, Plaintiff had, prior to the accident
of June 4, 1991, suffered injuries to his ankle, shoulder and
upper neck. However, as argued in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine,
none of these injuries had affected Plaintiff's lower back, the
injury at issue in the case at bar, and none of the injuries had
rendered the Plaintiff unable to work.4

Notwithstanding, the

court denied Plaintiff's Motion in Limine and ultimately allowed
the evidence to be adduced at trial.
Here, inasmuch as the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff
in prior incidents were wholly unrelated to the injury at issue
in

this

case,

namely

Plaintiff's

lower

back

injury,

such

evidence is not relevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule
402 of the Rules of Evidence.

Notwithstanding, in the event

These facts were confirmed by witnesses at trial.
17

that the court determined that such evidence had some limited
relevance, the only purpose that introduction of the sane would
accomplish would be unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
and misleading the jury.

In other terms, such evidence would

only be introduced as a smoke screen to shift the focus from the
medically substantiated injury sustained by the Plaintiff to
other unrelated injuries which are not dispositive of the issues
at the heart of this case.
Finally, in the event that introduction of the foregoing
evidence was to prove

that

Plaintiff

suffered

from a pre-

existing condition which was aggravated by the accident of June
4, 1991, such would not be sufficiently relevant to overcome the
limitations set forth in Rules 402 or 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant,
or asymptomatic condition, or one to which the injured
person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the
injured person for the full amount of damages which
ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or weakened
condition. In other words, when a latent condition
itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus an
injury brings on pain by aggravating the pre-existing
condition, then the injury, not the dormant condition,
is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. A
plaintiff, therefore is entitled to recover all
damages which actually and necessarily follow the
injury.
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
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In the case at bar, even had the defense offered the
foregoing evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff suffered from
a pre-existing condition, it would not necessarily be relevant
to the instant case since under Biswell, the Defendant would
still be liable for the full amount of damages sustained by
Plaintiff as a result of its negligence.

Accordingly, all such

evidence relating to injuries sustained by Plaintiff in previous
unrelated accidents should have been excluded.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the jury's verdict and the court's
amended judgment should be set aside. Alternatively, this court
should determine that the court abused its discretion in denying
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine and remand this case for a new
trial with instructions to bar all such evidence relating to
injuries sustained by Plaintiff in previous unrelated accidents.
DATED this 22

day of November, 1996.

MATT^BILJANIC / /
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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a true

and

correct
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copy of

day of November, 1996,

the

foregoing

APPELLANT, postage prepaid thereon to:
George T. Naegle, Esq.
Attorney for Appellee
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LOUIS ORTIZ,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 920902256

vs.
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of
the issue presented, answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was the defendant, Geneva Rock Products, negligent as

alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.

Was

Yes

defendant's

No
negligence

^
a proximate

cause

of

the

injuries sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

M
M <« 0 /. JL O

-2-

3.

Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by

the defendant?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes

No

Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of the

plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes

No

If you have answered both Questions 1 and 4 "yes," then,

and only then, answer the following question: Assuming all the
negligence that proximately

caused the plaintiff's

injuries to

total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Plaintiff Louis Ortiz

%

B.

Defendant Geneva Rock Products

%

TOTAL

6.

100

%

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "yes," state the

amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If
such

questions

question.

were

not

answered

"yes,11

do

not

answer

this

-3-

Special Damages:
A. Past Special Damages

$_

B. Future Special Damages

$_

General Damages:

$_

TOTAL

DATED this

J\j^

$_

day of September, 1994.
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GEORGE T. NAEGLE [A5001]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOUIS ORTIZ,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920902256 PI

GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC. ,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant.
This matter came on for a trial by jury on September 21
through September 23, 1994 with the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
presiding.

The jury heard the evidence of the respective parties

and the argument of counsel, and having been submitted a Special
Verdict and having answered the questions contained on the
Special Verdict Form as follows:
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence.

If you find the evidence

preponderates in favor of the issues presented, answer "Yes."

If

you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot

o o ^ * <*

determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer
lf

No.n

Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence,
1.

Was the defendant, Geneva Rock Products, negligent

as alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Having answered "No," to Question No. 1, the jury
answered no further questions on the Special Verdict Form and it
was signed by Mr. Porter who was acting as foreperson.
Accordingly, the jury has returned a verdict of no
cause of action and judgment is entered in accordance with that
jury verdict for no cause of action.

The plaintiff's Complaint

against the defendant is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon
the merits, and the prevailing party, the defendant is hereby
awarded costs of $

. 3j<
V, day
.

DATED this

of

"

/7... 7)
1995.
BY'THE COURT:

U ^ "7^6^
Tfcte Honorable Tyro
District Court Ju"'

0 v« I* * «• i

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on
this f/jfl
day of
April
, 1995, to the following:
Matt Biljanic
7355 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MATT BILJANIC A0323
Attorney for Plaintiff
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047
Phone: 255-3576
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LOUIS ORTIZ,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff, and Appellant
Case No. 920902256PI
(Trial Court)

vs.
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC.,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant, and Appellee.
1.

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and

Appellant, Louis Ortiz, through counsel, Matt Biljanic,
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley entered in this matter on the 6th
day of December, 1994.
2.

The appeal is taken from the entire judgment,

including the Court's ruling on Plaintiff!s Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial and
judgment for costs entered April 5, 1995 and the subsequent
judgment entered April 28, 1995.
DATED this

7

day of

,1995,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal and Undertaking on
Appeal to George T. Naegle, Attorney for Defendant, Key Bank
Tower, Seventh Floor, 50 South Main Street, P.O. Box 24 65,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this J/_^_day

of

7)\ftc^

f

.

1995

-

MATT BILJANjfC

~\

